Following the Cold War and intensifying in the post 9/11 world, Europe and the United States are headed down different paths.  Europe belongs to a softer world of international law, diplomacy, welfare states, and peace.  The United States, on the other hand, remains in the land of hegemony, unilateralism, free markets, and war.  Few people are likely to doubt that Europe and the U.S. are very different.  Many may even concede, as does Kagan, that these differences are “deep, long in development, and likely to endure” (Kagan 3).  However, while the United States and EU are indeed diverging, this divergence will not be permanent and is occurring in order for the EU and U.S. to ultimately converge in a “European” world.

      In order to get a taste of the divide between America and the EU, one must look no further than public opinion polls.  At their extreme, Germany and France are the major pulling force in the divergence, with one European Public Opinion poll showing that 74% of Germans and 69% of French citizens believe the United States are having a mostly negative impact on the world.  Even a less contentious country such as Italy has 47% of the population with this same view.  In a poll of European countries’ “warm, favorable feeling” toward the United States, the U.K. led the way with a 57% (on a scale of 0 (cold) to 100 (warm)). (“European Public Opinion”).  While a 57% is technically a favorable rating, one would imagine the United States’ closest ally in Europe should have more than a borderline lukewarm feeling toward them.  On this side of the Atlantic, more Americans strongly disagree with the statement “Europe is having a mainly positive influence in the world” than those that strongly agree.  In general, 41% of Americans say that they “do not understand current events in Europe” (“American Public Opinion”).  There seems to be neither an enthusiasm for Europe’s role in the world, nor a particularly strong interest in the EU.  All of these public opinion statistics point toward a divide between the cultures and views of the U.S. and EU.

      As the public opinion displays a fissure in the Transatlantic relationship, the countries’ governments exacerbate the divide.  Take the issue of trade and regulations as one example.  The EU has done its best to keep American genetically modified foods out of Europe, in spite of no scientific backing.  The impact to the U.S. farming sector of restrictions on GM foods is substantial.  One third of American farming acres are intended to grow crops to be exported.  A large percentage of those crops have been genetically modified “to produce strains that are more productive and pest-resistant” (Magnusson).  Europe’s misinformed protectionism strikes a significant blow to the U.S. economy.  As well, it goes against the aim of open markets and free trade that the Transatlantic relationship is supposed to be fostering. One cannot mistake this as peaceful cooperation.

      Outside of the realm of trade, many examples of the U.S. turning right and the EU left exist within the state of power and military might.  Europe has been on a track of weakening military power, while the United States continues to grow stronger.  A quick look at military spending reveals this.  Following the Cold War, Europeans became excited over peace and defense spending dropped to under 2% of GDP on average. During the Balkan intervention, the EU displayed its weakening power.  This conflict “revealed European military incapacity and political disarray.”  Kosovo added to the illustration of a widening gap in military ability and technology between the EU and U.S.  The Europeans role has degraded into that of providing peacekeeping forces following U.S. military action.  As Kagan phrased it, the United States make the dinner and the Europeans do the dishes (Kagan 7-8).  This relationship was again seen in the Afghanistan invasion, as the U.S. did the military work, and the EU took over an important role when it came time for peacekeeping.  The United States and Europe have diverged into a hard power and a soft power, respectively.

      Although, this shift in power does not imply an advantage for the United States, as the EU has, while rejecting hard power, been performing a soft “takeover” of the world.  To return to the genetically modified foods example, the European Union’s flawed science has expanded outside of the border, manifesting itself in fatal government policies.  In southern Africa, a place all too familiar with famine, “confused leaders follow the Europeans and their junk science” at the expense of 14 million starving people.  Zimbabwe and Zambia were unwilling to take free “contaminated” grain from the U.S because the Europeans are not willing to eat GM food, so why should they.  Besides Africa, major economic players such as China, New Zealand, and Japan have warmed up to the EU’s decision to ban the U.S.’s GM food (Magnusson).  Europe may not possess the military power of the U.S., but that does not seem to stop the spread of EU sentiment and regulations across the globe.

      Not only has the EU been influential in the economic world, but the EU has physically expanded its sphere of influence.  The newest members of the Union include the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.  As well, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are candidates seeking to join the EU, not to mention countries with special relationships and “preferential treatment.”  The United States, on the other hand, remains within its own borders physically and will, for the foreseeable future, not be expanding anywhere.  This places America at a disadvantage in expanding there sphere of influence.  There is no easier way to acquire political influence over a country than to add it to your own state.  America can continue to try and bolster goodwill internationally, something the U.S. has found difficult in recent events, and develop alliances, but the U.S. does not have the option of physically expanding its borders like the EU does.  The United States must more or less sit by and watch the EU expand in the name of spreading democracy, something the U.S. must support.

      As mentioned above, Turkey has long been a candidate for EU accession, which could be potentially devastating for the United States role on the world stage.  Turkey has been a “crucial ally for the West.”  As a member of NATO, it has served as the bridge between Europe and Asia, providing an “eastern flank.”   The United States has long counted on Turkey as friend in Middle-Eastern military operations.  Yet, Turkey’s dreams of joining the EU have caused significant reforms in Turkey, “including economic liberalization, human rights protection and greater civilian oversight of the military” (Phillips).  While no doubt these are positive changes for Turkey, they are changes influenced by the EU, not the U.S.  With the Europeans not fully on the same page as the United States in terms of intervention in the Middle East, as evidenced by Iraq, losing Turkey to the Europeans will lessen the United States world influence and increase Europe’s expanding authority.  On top of this, the EU would acquire its first Muslim state, and a large one at that.  If the EU could foster a friendly relationship with an influential, democratic Muslim state, they could find themselves with a strong foothold in the Middle East.  While the Middle Eastern countries continue to be annoyed by U.S. intervention in their affairs, the EU may find themselves in a position of influence in the Middle East, maybe even one in which their influence is welcome.

      As another factor in Europe’s takeover, with the United States preferring to act unilaterally or bilaterally instead of through multilateral organizations, the EU has been garnering more world support and will continue to rally the world around themselves through cooperation.  When the United States went to war in Iraq, they did so in large part unilaterally.  Most European countries, such as France and Germany, wanted to get approval from the UN first.  This basic trend presents itself in general in respect to multilateral institutions. Some examples include disputes over the Rio and Kyoto environmental agreements and the International Criminal Court.  The Bush administration fails to “consult, explain, justify, and cajole in the manner of previous administrations.”  For example, Bush “casually announced withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol at a luncheon for NATO ambassadors.”  This type of conduct has led to a distaste of how America does business on the international stage (Lindberg 142-3).  The EU has been more willing to cooperate with other countries, while the United States does not let anyone check their power.  By definition, this will certainly lead to the EU continuing to peacefully exert their influence onto other countries in the guise of cooperation, while those same countries turn their back on the United States’ hegemonic way of conducting itself.  With the United States acting uncooperatively, it only seems natural for the world to choose the EU as their first option to rally around.

      While the current state of affairs in trade, public opinion, and power paints a clear picture of division, this state is indeed transitory and has an aim of eventual convergence, in spite of Kagan’s claims to the contrary.  As the European Union continues to exude its soft power over the globe, the United States will begin to be influenced by the EU, with its hard power no longer necessary.  This following of the leader is already occurring to a slight degree, although not nearly enough to redefine the overall divergence.  As an example, the United States view on the death penalty, a favorite European example of the American’s love of violence, has been softening.  Across the U.S., “states have imposed moratoria on executions,” African-Americans no longer support the death penalty due to its racial imbalances, and no states “seem much inclined to consider adopting it, or [is anyone] advocating the broadening of existing death penalty legislation in order to increase the number of executions” (Lindberg 233-4).  So, even divisions between the EU and U.S. are actually just a difference in pace between them in changing policies.  The EU did not always ban the death penalty, but it eventually did; the United States has been following the same path, just slower.  Such shifts of varying speeds can be seen across many of the issues that are deemed divisions between the two.

      As this paper has described, the EU has been using its soft power to expand both physically and politically, exerting influence into the Middle East, Japan, China, Africa, and beyond.  The United States, meanwhile, has facilitated this change in two important ways: first, allowing Europe to conduct peaceful operations by fighting their battles for them and second, rallying other countries around the EU by acting uncooperatively on the international stage.  Once the European Union finds itself influential across the entire globe, the United States’ hard power will no longer be the necessity it currently remains.  The political atmosphere will turn more “European” in the U.S., as witnessed by the shift in death penalty sentiment and other issues such as universal healthcare, an increasingly more politically attractive idea.  The transformation from the Hobbesian to the Kantian world that Europe went through will speed up and occur in the United States as well, as the current divergence in the Transatlantic relationship does not remain, but reveals itself as the tool for the ultimate convergence.

Works Cited

“American Public Opinion”

“European Public Opinion”

Kagan, Robert. "Power and Weakness." Policy Review (2002).

Lindberg, Tod. Beyond Paradise and Power. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Magnusson, Paul. "Biotech Food: Europe's Phony Open Door." Business Week (2002).

Phillips, David L. "Turkey's Dreams of Accession." Council on Foreign Relations 83 (2004).