During Saturday’s Pirates-Nationals game, pitcher Matt Chico came to the plate with a runner on first (Paul Lo Duca) and one out. The score was 2-1 Nationals in the bottom of the second inning. Chico fouled off the first pitch swinging. The Pirates announcers were absolutely shocked that Chico was not bunting the runner up to second base. They could not imagine why anyone would even question making the call to bunt.
However, Manny Acta was displaying his knowledge of the game, instead of relying on “the book.” In order to show why this was a smart move by Acta, we will ironically turn to a book called, The Book, written by Tom Tango, amongst others. This book uses statistical tools to reevaluate “the book.” Gathering the rule from The Book, it states “With a pitcher at the plate with one out and a runner on first, only the worst-hitting pitchers should bunt, and even then, only about half the time.” Chico has a career batting average of.167, but this is with only 60 at bats. So, it would not have been a terrible move to bunt him, but swinging away was probably the more attractive option.
To break the rule down, the Run Expectancy for when a pitcher sacrifices in that situation is .326. On the other hand, when an average-hitting pitcher swings away, the RE is .354. With one of the worst-hitting pitchers swinging away the RE is .318, but rises to .325 if you account for the infielders being in. In other words, whether one of the worst-hitting pitchers bunts or swings, the outcome is about the same. Since Chico is better than the worst hitting pitchers, it would be better, on average, to have him swinging in this situation.
What was the outcome in real life? Chico showed bunt on the next couple pitches, taking them for balls. This kept the infield charging. On the fourth pitch, he sent a sharp grounder past Adam LaRoche at first base, placing runners on the corners with still only one out (a RE over 1.00). The Nationals left the inning up 5-1 and went on to a 9-8 victory. Kudos to Acta for going against “the book” and relying on The Book.
Following the Cold War and intensifying in the post 9/11 world, Europe and the United States are headed down different paths. Europe belongs to a softer world of international law, diplomacy, welfare states, and peace. The United States, on the other hand, remains in the land of hegemony, unilateralism, free markets, and war. Few people are likely to doubt that Europe and the U.S. are very different. Many may even concede, as does Kagan, that these differences are “deep, long in development, and likely to endure” (Kagan 3). However, while the United States and EU are indeed diverging, this divergence will not be permanent and is occurring in order for the EU and U.S. to ultimately converge in a “European” world.
In order to get a taste of the divide between America and the EU, one must look no further than public opinion polls. At their extreme, Germany and France are the major pulling force in the divergence, with one European Public Opinion poll showing that 74% of Germans and 69% of French citizens believe the United States are having a mostly negative impact on the world. Even a less contentious country such as Italy has 47% of the population with this same view. In a poll of European countries’ “warm, favorable feeling” toward the United States, the U.K. led the way with a 57% (on a scale of 0 (cold) to 100 (warm)). (“European Public Opinion”). While a 57% is technically a favorable rating, one would imagine the United States’ closest ally in Europe should have more than a borderline lukewarm feeling toward them. On this side of the Atlantic, more Americans strongly disagree with the statement “Europe is having a mainly positive influence in the world” than those that strongly agree. In general, 41% of Americans say that they “do not understand current events in Europe” (“American Public Opinion”). There seems to be neither an enthusiasm for Europe’s role in the world, nor a particularly strong interest in the EU. All of these public opinion statistics point toward a divide between the cultures and views of the U.S. and EU.
As the public opinion displays a fissure in the Transatlantic relationship, the countries’ governments exacerbate the divide. Take the issue of trade and regulations as one example. The EU has done its best to keep American genetically modified foods out of Europe, in spite of no scientific backing. The impact to the U.S. farming sector of restrictions on GM foods is substantial. One third of American farming acres are intended to grow crops to be exported. A large percentage of those crops have been genetically modified “to produce strains that are more productive and pest-resistant” (Magnusson). Europe’s misinformed protectionism strikes a significant blow to the U.S. economy. As well, it goes against the aim of open markets and free trade that the Transatlantic relationship is supposed to be fostering. One cannot mistake this as peaceful cooperation.
Outside of the realm of trade, many examples of the U.S. turning right and the EU left exist within the state of power and military might. Europe has been on a track of weakening military power, while the United States continues to grow stronger. A quick look at military spending reveals this. Following the Cold War, Europeans became excited over peace and defense spending dropped to under 2% of GDP on average. During the Balkan intervention, the EU displayed its weakening power. This conflict “revealed European military incapacity and political disarray.” Kosovo added to the illustration of a widening gap in military ability and technology between the EU and U.S. The Europeans role has degraded into that of providing peacekeeping forces following U.S. military action. As Kagan phrased it, the United States make the dinner and the Europeans do the dishes (Kagan 7-8). This relationship was again seen in the Afghanistan invasion, as the U.S. did the military work, and the EU took over an important role when it came time for peacekeeping. The United States and Europe have diverged into a hard power and a soft power, respectively.
Although, this shift in power does not imply an advantage for the United States, as the EU has, while rejecting hard power, been performing a soft “takeover” of the world. To return to the genetically modified foods example, the European Union’s flawed science has expanded outside of the border, manifesting itself in fatal government policies. In southern Africa, a place all too familiar with famine, “confused leaders follow the Europeans and their junk science” at the expense of 14 million starving people. Zimbabwe and Zambia were unwilling to take free “contaminated” grain from the U.S because the Europeans are not willing to eat GM food, so why should they. Besides Africa, major economic players such as China, New Zealand, and Japan have warmed up to the EU’s decision to ban the U.S.’s GM food (Magnusson). Europe may not possess the military power of the U.S., but that does not seem to stop the spread of EU sentiment and regulations across the globe.
Not only has the EU been influential in the economic world, but the EU has physically expanded its sphere of influence. The newest members of the Union include the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. As well, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are candidates seeking to join the EU, not to mention countries with special relationships and “preferential treatment.” The United States, on the other hand, remains within its own borders physically and will, for the foreseeable future, not be expanding anywhere. This places America at a disadvantage in expanding there sphere of influence. There is no easier way to acquire political influence over a country than to add it to your own state. America can continue to try and bolster goodwill internationally, something the U.S. has found difficult in recent events, and develop alliances, but the U.S. does not have the option of physically expanding its borders like the EU does. The United States must more or less sit by and watch the EU expand in the name of spreading democracy, something the U.S. must support.
As mentioned above, Turkey has long been a candidate for EU accession, which could be potentially devastating for the United States role on the world stage. Turkey has been a “crucial ally for the West.” As a member of NATO, it has served as the bridge between Europe and Asia, providing an “eastern flank.” The United States has long counted on Turkey as friend in Middle-Eastern military operations. Yet, Turkey’s dreams of joining the EU have caused significant reforms in Turkey, “including economic liberalization, human rights protection and greater civilian oversight of the military” (Phillips). While no doubt these are positive changes for Turkey, they are changes influenced by the EU, not the U.S. With the Europeans not fully on the same page as the United States in terms of intervention in the Middle East, as evidenced by Iraq, losing Turkey to the Europeans will lessen the United States world influence and increase Europe’s expanding authority. On top of this, the EU would acquire its first Muslim state, and a large one at that. If the EU could foster a friendly relationship with an influential, democratic Muslim state, they could find themselves with a strong foothold in the Middle East. While the Middle Eastern countries continue to be annoyed by U.S. intervention in their affairs, the EU may find themselves in a position of influence in the Middle East, maybe even one in which their influence is welcome.
As another factor in Europe’s takeover, with the United States preferring to act unilaterally or bilaterally instead of through multilateral organizations, the EU has been garnering more world support and will continue to rally the world around themselves through cooperation. When the United States went to war in Iraq, they did so in large part unilaterally. Most European countries, such as France and Germany, wanted to get approval from the UN first. This basic trend presents itself in general in respect to multilateral institutions. Some examples include disputes over the Rio and Kyoto environmental agreements and the International Criminal Court. The Bush administration fails to “consult, explain, justify, and cajole in the manner of previous administrations.” For example, Bush “casually announced withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol at a luncheon for NATO ambassadors.” This type of conduct has led to a distaste of how America does business on the international stage (Lindberg 142-3). The EU has been more willing to cooperate with other countries, while the United States does not let anyone check their power. By definition, this will certainly lead to the EU continuing to peacefully exert their influence onto other countries in the guise of cooperation, while those same countries turn their back on the United States’ hegemonic way of conducting itself. With the United States acting uncooperatively, it only seems natural for the world to choose the EU as their first option to rally around.
While the current state of affairs in trade, public opinion, and power paints a clear picture of division, this state is indeed transitory and has an aim of eventual convergence, in spite of Kagan’s claims to the contrary. As the European Union continues to exude its soft power over the globe, the United States will begin to be influenced by the EU, with its hard power no longer necessary. This following of the leader is already occurring to a slight degree, although not nearly enough to redefine the overall divergence. As an example, the United States view on the death penalty, a favorite European example of the American’s love of violence, has been softening. Across the U.S., “states have imposed moratoria on executions,” African-Americans no longer support the death penalty due to its racial imbalances, and no states “seem much inclined to consider adopting it, or [is anyone] advocating the broadening of existing death penalty legislation in order to increase the number of executions” (Lindberg 233-4). So, even divisions between the EU and U.S. are actually just a difference in pace between them in changing policies. The EU did not always ban the death penalty, but it eventually did; the United States has been following the same path, just slower. Such shifts of varying speeds can be seen across many of the issues that are deemed divisions between the two.
As this paper has described, the EU has been using its soft power to expand both physically and politically, exerting influence into the Middle East, Japan, China, Africa, and beyond. The United States, meanwhile, has facilitated this change in two important ways: first, allowing Europe to conduct peaceful operations by fighting their battles for them and second, rallying other countries around the EU by acting uncooperatively on the international stage. Once the European Union finds itself influential across the entire globe, the United States’ hard power will no longer be the necessity it currently remains. The political atmosphere will turn more “European” in the U.S., as witnessed by the shift in death penalty sentiment and other issues such as universal healthcare, an increasingly more politically attractive idea. The transformation from the Hobbesian to the Kantian world that Europe went through will speed up and occur in the United States as well, as the current divergence in the Transatlantic relationship does not remain, but reveals itself as the tool for the ultimate convergence.
Works Cited
“American Public Opinion”
“European Public Opinion”
Kagan, Robert. "Power and Weakness." Policy Review (2002).
Lindberg, Tod. Beyond Paradise and Power. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Magnusson, Paul. "Biotech Food: Europe's Phony Open Door." Business Week (2002).
Phillips, David L. "Turkey's Dreams of Accession." Council on Foreign Relations 83 (2004).
Worst of all, the [Organic Consumers Association] would throw thousands of Third-World workers out of their jobs by insisting on policies intended to artificially inflate wages in coffee-producing nations. Refusing to trade with countries that cannot match U.S. wages or working conditions is exactly the wrong approach to raising living standards abroad. The OCA's brand of humanitarian protectionism may be "killing with kindness," but it is killing nonetheless.
Imagine a politician running for President during the Industrial Revolution, standing up in front of the country and grumbling over the loss of farming jobs. They would decry the loss of thousands of agricultural jobs due to the booming manufacturing sector. Looking back upon this with the eyes of someone who owes much of their prosperity to the Industrial Revolution, this politician now seems to be a fool. Yet, someone in that day probably would have large support for such a farming-sympathetic position, just as politicians such as Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton now have support for the loss of manufacturing jobs. One may not see this as a fair comparison because farming jobs were lost to “progress,”while manufacturing jobs are lost to “unfair trade practices.” Wrong! The loss of manufacturing jobs has been a result of technological changes and a shift toward white-collar jobs in the economy (aka progress). By the way, the unemployment rate is lower nowadays with increased trade than before the liberalization of the 90s. As well, the economy has continued to add jobs, more than replacing any lost manufacturing jobs. Trade has replaced worse jobs with better ones, without creating long-term employment. So, when Obama and Clinton speak of the dangers of unfair trade and the damage it has done our manufacturing sector (which is producing at record output levels and profits), it is no more intelligent than someone complaining over the “harmful effects”of the Industrial Revolution, and we all know how bad that one turned out for our standard of living. So the next time Obama is on your T.V. telling you he will “fight for the worker,” and Clinton is telling you it is a fact that “you cannot be a strong nation without a strong manufacturing sector,” what they are really saying is “we will fight so strong for the labor union lobbyists that we will send the U.S. back into pre-Industrial Revolution times.”
]]>Left Field: Matt Holliday
Holliday, now in his prime years, is good for 30 HRs and a high
OBP. Adam Dunn has more HR power, but brings negative value to the
field (lots of it) and on the basepaths. Since Dunn has "old player"
skills, a big improvement in his prime probably will not come. Alfonso
Soriano has never had the on-base skills to be an elite player, and he
lacks consistency from year to year in terms of defense. Also, at
32-years-old, one should start expecting a decline in the next few
years. Jason Bay would have been a yearly MVP candidate before last
year if he did not play for the Pirates. Last year, one of the most
well-rounded players in the game saw his production drop drastically.
This was partially due to injury/rehab issues, but it was a big enough
drop to be a major concern. By far, Holliday is the safest pick with
the most upside at this position.
Center Field: Jay Bruce
This man is the future of the outfield in the National League.
It could take a few years, but Bruce should be a 40-HR guy with an
above-average OBP in his prime. Bruce may not have the defensive
capabilities to stay in center, but his bat will be valuable at any
position. At 21-years-old, there is no sense in rushing Bruce, but he
already has the skills to play in the majors. Other CFs like Hunter
Pence (older, less power), Justin Upton (too young, did not impress in
majors), and Carlos Beltran (on the decline) all have weaknesses
placing them below Bruce.
Right Field: Corey Hart